United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit



APPENDIX

76-7316

In The

United States Court of Appeals

For The Second Circuit

JOSEPH BOSSOM,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

P/5

vs.

NAOMI BOSSOM and STANLEY E. KOOPER,

Defendants-Appellees.

On Appeal from an Order from the United States District Confor the Eastern District of New York.

APPENDIX FOR APPELLANT

GELBWAKS & POLLACK

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 299 Broadway

New York, New York 10007 (212) 732-2540

PAGINATION AS IN ORIGINAL COPY

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BOSSOM, JOSEPH

JOSEPH BOSSOM

BOSSOM, NAOMI & ANO.

NAOMI BOSSOM and STANLEY E. KOOPER

CAUSE

28 USC 1332-BREACH OF AGREEMENT IN PAYMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT CONDITIONS ON THE PART OF THE DEFTS.

FOR PLTFF: Gelbwaks & Pollack 299 Broadway New York, N.Y. 10007 732-2540 ATTOFNEYS

FOR DEFT: STANLEY E. KOOPER 16 Court Street Bklyn, N.Y. 11241 U.5-2324



IF CASE ONE

THENGTERS FAID

C D NUMBER B

J. BOSSOM V. N. BOSSOM & ANO.

PANTE.	PROCLEDINGS	
08-28-75	Complaint filed. Summons issued.	(1)
9-19-75	Summons returned & filed/Executed.	(2)
9/22/75	ANSWER of deft Stanley E. Kooper filed.	(3)
9/22/75	Answer of Naomi Bossom filed.	(4)
5/4/76	Notice 6f Motion for Summary Judgment in Favor of Pltff, ret. 5/14/76 filed	
5/4/76	Memorandum of Law filed.	(6)
5-13-75	Notice of cross-motion ret. 5-14-76 with defts memo of law in opposition to pltff's motion for summary judgment and memo law to di8smiss pltff's complaint filed. (
5-14-76	Before COSTANTINO, J Case called for pltff's motion for summary judgment Motion argued Decision reserved	
5-18-76 5-18-76	Affidavit in opposition to cross motion for dismissal filed Supplemental memorandum of law filed.	(10) (11)
6-1-76	By COSTANTINO, J-Memorandum & Order dtd 6-1-76 dismissing the	
6-2-76	case. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment. p/c JUDGMENT dtd 6-2-76 dismissing the case filed.	(12) (13)
-24-76	Notice of appeal filed. Copy mailed to C of A.	(14)
7-12-76	Civil appeal scheduling order filed.	(15)
7-22-76	Undertaking for costs on appeal filed.	(16)
8-9-76	Civil appeal scheduling order filed.	(17)
8-27-76	Above record certified & handed to Michael Moskowitz for delivered to C of A.	ery

LE IS ON ET CLERK

NOTICE OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Filed May 4, 1976)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

JOSEPH BOSSOM,

Plaintiff,

-against-

NAOMI BOSSOM and STANLEY E. KOOPER,

Defendants.

NOTICE OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF

Civil Action No. 75 C 1420

(M.A.C.)

SIR:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that upon the affidavit of JOSEPH BOSSOM, duly sworn to the 12th day of March, 1976, annexed hereto, and the affidavit of I. MILES POLLACK, duly sworn to the 3rd day of May, 1976, annexed hereto, and upon the summons, complaint, the answers of the defendants, and upon all the papers and proceedings heretofore had herein, plaintiff will move this Court before the Honorable Mark A. Constantino, United States District Court Judge, at the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, 225 Cadman Plaza East, County of Kings, City and State of New York, on the 14th day of May, 1976, at 10:00 A.M., pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for summary judgment in the plaintiff's favor and against the defendants, granting the relief requested in plaintiff's complaint upon the ground that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts with respect to the allegations of the

complaint herein and that plaintiff is entitled to judgment on the complaint as a matter of law, and for such other and further relief as to this Court may seem just and proper in the premises.

PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that the defendants are required pursuant to the Rules of this Court, to serve answering affidavits, if any, at least three (3) days prior to the return date of this motion.

Dated: New York, New York May 3, 1976

Yours, etc.

GELBWAKS & POLLACKS

Attorneys for Plainti

I. Miles Pollack

A Member of the Firm

Office and P.O. Address

299 Broadway

New York, New York 10007

732-2540

TO: STANLEY E. KOOPER, ESQ.
Attorney for Defendants
16 Court Street
Brooklyn, New York 11241

AFFIDAVIT OF JOSEPH BOSSOM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

JOSEPH BOSSOM,

Plaintiff,

PLAINTIFF'S AFFIDAVIT

-against-

Civil Action No. 75 C 1420

NAOMI BOSSOM and STANLEY E. KOOPER,

(M.A.C.)

Defendants.

STATE OF NEW YORK)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK)

JOSEPH BOSSOM, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

- I am the plaintiff in this action and I have personal knowledge of the facts herein set forth.
- 2. This affidavit is submitted in support of the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment herein, for the purpose of showing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact in this action, and that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
- 3. The subject of this action concerns a stipulation which was entered into on April 15, 1974, between the plaintiff and the defendant, NAOMI BOSSOM, and an escrow agreement, signed by the defendant, STANLEY E. KOOPER, on April 15, 1974.
- 4. The stipulation and the escrow agreement were executed in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of

Kings, prior to the commencement of a trial of an action for a divorce between the plaintiff and NAOMI BOSSOM. After entering into the stipulation in the matrimonial action, I withdrew my answer, and NAOMI BOSSOM was granted a judgment of divorce on or about July 1, 1974, and the stipulation and escrow agreement were incorporated in that judgment. 6. Certain provisions in the stipulation and the escrow agreement in its entirety, are contrary to the public policy of the State of New York, and also are so onerous and so unfair as to be unconscionable; therefore, these provisions, which will be more fully described subsequently herein, are void and unenforceable. The stipulation as a whole is tainted by the inclusion of these provisions and thus should be vitiated in its entirety. There are no genuine issues of fact present in this action. There is no denial that the stipulation agreement, a copy of which is attached and marked Exhibit "l", and the escrow agreement, a copy of which is attached and marked Exhibit "2", which are annexed to the complaint, and made a part thereof, a copy of which is attached and marked Exhibit "3", were executed between the parties herein. The only question which is before the Court is whether, as a matter of law, the provisions of the stipulation and escrow agreement are void and unenforceable as alleged in the complaint herein. The marital home of NAOMI BOSSOM and myself, which is located at 284 Garfield Place, Brooklyn, New York, was - 2 -

owned as a tenancy by the entirety prior to our divorce and as a tenancy in common subsequently thereto, up to and including the present time.

- 9. Paragraph 4 of the stipulation deals with the marital home. NOAMI BOSSOM was given exclusive possession of our house until our youngest child reaches the age of twenty-one (21) years, at which time the house is to be sold and the profits from such sale divided equally. There was never any intention that the judgment of divorce have any effect whatso-ever on our respective ownership interests in this property.
- 10. I believe that the reasonable market value of our house is approximately Ninety Thousand (\$90,000.00) Dollars. I also believe that there is presently a mortgage on the house which totals approximately Ten Thousand (\$10,000.00) Dollars. Therefore, my ownership equity in this property is approximately Forty Thousand (\$40,000.00) Dollars.
- 11. The provisions contained in Paragraph 5 of the stipulation are so onerous, unfair, and unconscionable that they should not be enforced and should be declared void as a matter of law. The operation of this clause would result in the forfeiture of my property and would constitute a penalty which is contrary to the public policy of the State of New York. Paragraph 5 states as follows:

Both paragraph #2 concerning visitation and paragraph 4 concerning house shall be contingent upon the husband paying the full amount he is obligated to pay hereunder. With regard to visitation, there is a dependent covenant with paragraph concerning support payment.

Upon the father's default in any payment the wife shall have the right to refuse the father visitation. Furthermore upon any default by the father in paying the amount he has obligated himself to pay the wife's attorney shall 14 days after default file a deed which the husband has executed this date in person. The filing of the deed shall not relieve the husband's obligation hereunder. The consideration for title shall be past amounts due.

- 12. In order to satisfy the automatic operation of the penalty provisions contained in Paragraph 5, I executed a quitclaim deed to my interest in the marital home to NOAMI BOSSOM simultaneously with the execution of the stipulation and gave this deed to the defendant, STANLEY E. KOOPER, pursuant to the terms of the escrow agreement.
- 13. There can be no question that my forfeiture of my interest in the house would result from my default in any payment for a period which lasted fourteen (14) days. Neither sudden illness, hospitalization, unforeseen poverty, accident, mistake, or other reasonable cause for delay would stay the automatic operation of this obvious penalty should such a default in payment take place.
- 14. The sole purpose of this provision is to provide a penalty for any fourteen (14) day default in payment, regardless of cause or justification, and the attempt to disguise it by stating that the consideration for such a forfeiture will be past consideration due lacks even a nominal degree of sophistication. The shocking result of a default in one

Five Hundred Forty (\$540.00) Dollars payment would be a forfeiture of an ownership interest in the approximate amount of Forty Thousand (\$40,000.00) Dollars. I trust that this shocks the conscience of the Court.

- 15. As has already been stated, the activation of the provisions contained in Paragraph 5 would result in a penalty; however, the only penalty thus far discussed has been an economic one. The stipulation does not rest at that point. It not only seeks an economic sanction but attempts to mete out emotional sanction as well. Not only may I be made to suffer, by being deprived of the association of my children, but they must suffer regardless of their wants and desires. This onerous result can only be described as unconscionable.
- 16. The defendants have alleged two affirmative defenses in their answers, copies of which are attached and marked Exhibits "4" and "5". The substance of these defenses is that I had previously elected to proceed in the courts of the State of New York and that this action is therefore barred by the principles of res judicata and election of remedies. These defenses are dealt with in detail in my attorneys' affidavit and in their memorandum of law.

WHEREFORE, this deponent respectfully prays that the motion of the plaintiff for summary judgment granting the relief requested in the complaint be granted.

JOSEPH BOSSOM

Sworn to before me this

day of Thue 6 1976.

Marin Jacon

AFFIDAVIT OF I. MILES POLLACK IN SUPPORT OF MOTION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

JOSEPH BOSSOM.

Plaintiff,

riainciii

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

-against-

Civil Action No. 75 C 1420

NAOMI BOSSOM and STANLEY E. KOOPER,

(M.A.C.)

Defendants.

- I. MILES POLLACK, being duly sworn, deposes and says:
- 1. I am an attorney and counsellor-at-law admitted to practice in the courts of this state, including this Court, and I am a member of the firm of GELBWAKS & POLLACK, the attorneys for the plaintiff in the above entitled action; and I am fully familiar with all of the facts and circumstances herein. This affidavit is made in conjunction with the plaintiff's affidavit in support of plaintiff's motion for summary judgment herein.
- 2. The plaintiff's accompanying affidavit sets forth in detail all of the relevant facts involved in this action; therefore, a reiteration of the material and essential facts is unnecessary.
- 3. In substance the issues now before the Court are purely a matter of law. The sole question to be decided is whether the Stipulation and Escrow Agreement, which are the

- 9. The relief requested in said motion was that the judgment of divorce be resettled so as to provide that the Stipulation be merged in the judgment and not survive. The Supreme Court denied plaintiff's motion finding that it was the intent of the plaintiff and the defendant, NAOMI BOSSOM, (the plaintiff in that action) that the Stipulation survive the judgment of divorce and not be merged therein.
- 10. The motion which was decided in the Supreme Court has no bearing or relationship whatsoever to the relief sought in the action which is now before this Court. Had the said motion been granted and the Stipulation thereby merged in the judgment, then there would have been no need for the present action because the Stipulation would not have had the effect of a separate and individual contract between the parties.
- 11. There can be no claim of res judicata resulting from the Supreme Court's decision. That Court would have lacked jurisdiction to decide the validity of the Stipulation. It was not sitting as a court of general jurisdiction, but rather it had acquired jurisdiction only with respect to the matrimonial action. The issue as to the validity of the Stipulation could only have been raised in a separate plenary proceeding; thus, not only did the plaintiff not raise the question of validity, but as a matter of law he could not have done so.

- 12. As to the claim that plaintiff has elected his remedy, this is also completely without basis in fact or in law. The plaintiff sought to resettle a judgment of divorce which he felt did not reflect the intent of the parties thereto. He did not waive his right to question the validity of the Stipulation in a separate plenary action by so proceeding. As previously stated, the plaintiff could not have litigated both issues in the same proceeding.
- 13. The only logical conclusion which can be reached is that the relief sought in the action before the Supreme Court of the State of New York and in this action are completely different in nature and effect, one involving a question for the matrimonial court and the other involving the essential validity of a contract having no relation whatsoever to the prior matrimonial action.
- of fact is presented with respect to the issues in this action and that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment for the relief sought in his complaint as a matter of law.

WHEREFORE, your deponent respectfully prays for an order granting the plaintiff's motion in all respects.

I. MILES POLLACK

Sworn to before me this 3rd day of May, 1976.

COMPLAINT (Filed August 28, 1975)

UNITED STATES DESTRICT COURT BASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

JOSEPH BOSSOM,

Plaintiff,

- against -

MACHI BOSSOM and STANLEY E. KOOPER.

Defendents.

Plaintiff, complaining of the defendants, by his attorney, GELBHARS and POLIACK, respectfully shows and alleges:

FIRST: That the plaintiff is a resident of the State of Maryland, residing at 4108 Maryland Avenue, Bathesda, Maryland.

SECOND: That the defendant, NAOMI BOSSOM, is a citizen of the State of New York, residing at 284 Garfield Place, Brooklyn, New York.

THIRD: That upon information and belief the defendant, STANLEY E, KOOPER, is a citizen of the State of New York.

POURTH: That there is a diversity of citizenship between the plaintiff and the defendants and this action is subject to the jurisdiction of this court, and the matter in controversy exceeds the sum of Ten Thousand (\$10,000.00) Dollars, exclusive of interest and costs.

FIFTH: That the plaintiff and the defendant, NACHI BOSSON,

were merried on September 19, 1954, in the City and State of New York.

SIXTH: That there are three children born of the aforementioned marriage, whose names and dates of birth are as follows:

JACK, born August 26, 1956; LUCY, born April 22, 1960; and;

CIARON, born December 22, 1965.

SEVENTH: That a judgment of divorce was granted to the defendant, NACHI BOSSOM, on or about July 1, 1974, dissolving the said marriage.

EIGHTH: That on or about April 15, 1974, the date of the trial of the action for a divorce, the plaintiff and the defendent, NAOMI BOSSOM, entered into a stipulation, a copy of which is attached and made a part hereof, which was incorporated in the said judgment of divorce.

NINTH: That pursuant to Paragraph 6 of the said stipulation, the plaintiff agreed to pay the defendent, NAONI BOSSOM, the sum of Five Hundred Forty (\$540.00) Dellars per month for the support and maintenance of their three aforementioned children.

TENTH: That pursuant to Paragraph 3 of the said stipulation, the plaintiff agreed to pay the tuition and other expenses of attending college for each child commencing when the child reaches the age of 18 years. In the event that the child resides every from the defendant's, NACHI BOSSOM'S, residence, then the

plaintiff's support obligation, as stated in Paragraph 6, is reduced by one-third.

ELEVENTH: That pursuant to Paragraph 4 of the said stipulation, the defendant, MACMI BOSSOM was given exclusive pessession
284 Carfield Place, Brooklyn, H.Y.,
of the marital home, Ashich was caused by the plaintiff and the
defendant, NACMI BOSSOM, as temants by the entirety before the said
divorce and which was, and still is, owned by them after the said
divorce as tenants in common. At the time that their youngest
child reaches the age of 21, years the house is to be said and the
proceeds of such sale divided equally.

THELFTH: That pursuant to Peragraphs 2 and 7 of the said stipulation, the plaintiff and the defendant, HACHE BOSSON, provided for the plaintiff to have visitation with their three children.

THIRTERITH: That pursuant to Paragraph 5 of the said stipulation, the plaintiff and the defendant, MACHE BOSSON, agreed that the visitation rights under Paragraph 2 and the provisions with respect to the marital home under Paragraph 4 are contingent upon the plaintiff making the full support payments as stated in the stipulation.

POURTHENTH: That pursuent to Paragraph 5 of the said stipulation, the plaintiff's aforementioned visitation rights are a dependent covenant with his support obligation, and that upon the plaintiff's default in any payment, the defendant, MACHE BOSSOM, has the right to refuse visitation.

PIPTERNITH: That pursuant to Paragraph 5 of the said stipulation, upon any default by the plaintiff in making any of the aforesaid support payments, the defendant's, MACHI BOSSOM'S attorney shall, 14 days after the default, file a deed which the plaintiff has executed in favor of the defendant, MACHI BOSSOM. The deed conveys the plaintiff's interest in the said marital home to the defendant, NACHI BOSSOM.

SIXTEMEN: That pursuant to Peragraph 5 of the said stipulation, the filing of the said deed shall not relieve the plaintiff of any of his support obligations under the stipulation.

SEVENTHENTH: That the plaintiff executed the said deed en er about April 15, 1974.

EIGHTEENTH: That the said deed was and still is held by the defendant, STANLEY E. KOOPER, the attorney for the defendant, MACRE BOSSOM.

STANLEY E. HOOPER, signed an escrew agreement, a copy of which is attached and made a part hereof, wherin he agreed to set as escrewe for the said deed and to hold the said deed for four years and to file the said deed upon notice from the defendent, MACRI BOSSOM, that the plaintiff has

been in default under the sems of the said stipulation for more than 14 days.

SEMEREE: That the provision in Paragraph 5 of the said exipulation which gives the defendant, MACH BOSSM, the right to refuse visitation in the event of a default in his payments by the plaintiff, is contrary to the law of the Seate of New York and is contrary to public policy and is null and wold and of no effect.

said stipulation, which states that the attermey for the defendant, making mossow, shall file the aforesaid deed in the event of a default by the plaintiff in making payments pursuant to the bares of the stipulation is a forfaiture or penalty; that by messan thereof, such provision is contrary to the law of the State of Max Tork and is contrary to public policy and is sall and wold and of no offact.

THENTY-SECOND: That upon information and belief the value of the said marital home is approximately Minety Thousand(\$90,000.00)

Dollars.

THERTY-THIRD: That upon information and balled there is a mortgage on the said marital home in the approximate amount of Man Thousand (\$10,000.00) Rollars.

THENTY-FOURTH: That in the event that the plaintiff is

and is in default for a period exceeding 14 days and as a result of which he ferfeits his one-half interest in the said marital home, then such forfeiture would be so onerous and so unfair as to be unconsciousble and therefore it should not be enforced.

TMENTY-FIFTH: That the dependent provisions of Paragraph 5 of the said stipulation are so patently illegal and unfair that the said stipulation as a whole is tainted and permeated by illegality and unfairness and is wold and unenforceable.

WHEREFORE, the plain of demands judgment seeinst the defendants declaring that the stipulation entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant, NACMI BOSSON, and the escrow agreement signed by the defendant, STANLEY E. KOOPER, are null and wold and of no effect and direction the defendant, STANLEY E. KOOPER, to return the deed, which was executed by the plaintiff, to the plaintiff and declaring that the deed is null and wold and of no effect, together with such other and further relief as to this Court may seem just and proper in the premises, together with the costs and disbursements of this action.

GELBWAKS & POLLACK Attorneys for Plaintiff Office & P.O. Address 299 Breadway New York, New York 10007

STIPULATION

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ESCROW AGREEMENT 4/1/14 (Styp) Stortey Exaper agres to delivered to hugh this date Me slave hard some for Jour years seging hereto Ball hold Stante, I Khaper Chamles That upon netification by ones Bossom that Her husband is in defacely ender the law of a slighter this detend ente in open conting for more trank 14 days Stanley Ellooper shall file the bleed unihant natura to any purty hereto. Stantey Estages Ognes and Consisted to Brown Mick thit Traomi possom

hrat name succession

ANSWER OF NAOMI BOSSOM (Filed September 22, 1975)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT RASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

JOHEFE BORROW,

Plaintiff.

-against-

VERTELED

NAOMI BOSSOM and STANLEY B. MOCPER,

Defendants.

Civil Action File No. 75C 1420

Defendant, NACMI BOSSOM, answering plaintiff's complaint, alleges:

FIRST: Denies each and every allegation contained in paragraphs
'FOURIH', 'ELEVENTH', 'TWENTISTH', 'TWENTY-FIRST', 'TWENTY-SECOND'', 'TWENTYTHIRD'', 'TWENTY-FOURTH' and 'TWENTY-FIFTH'.

AS AND FOR AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

SECOND: That plaintiff has litigated the same issues presented to this Court in the Courts of the State of New York, in which Courts plaintiff's action was dismissed; that said dismissal is res judicata as to the issues raised in this proceeding.

AS AND FOR A SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

THIFD: That plaintiff has litigated the same issues in the Courts of the State of New York and by said litigation in the Courts of the State of New York the plaintiff elected his remedy.

WHEREFORE, defendants demand judgment against the plaintiff

dismissing plaintiff's complaint.

Yours, etc. STANLEY E. KOOPER, Esq. Office and P.O. Address 16 Court Street Brooklyn, New York 11241 Atterney for Defendants ANSWER OF STANLEY E. KOOPER (Filed September 22, 1975)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

JOSEPH BOSSOM,

Plaintiff,

VERIFIED ANSWER

-against-

Civil Action File No. 75C 1420

NAOMI BOSSOM and STANLEY E. KNOPER,

Defendan &

Defendant, STANLEY E. KOOPER, Esq., answering plaintiff's complaint, alleges:

FIRST: Denies knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allerations contained in paragraphs "FIRST", "FOURIH", "FIRTH", "TWENTY-SHADND" and "TWENTY-THIRD".

SECOND: Denies each and every allegation contained in paragraphs
"TWENTIETH", "TWENTY-FIRST", "TWENTY-FOURTH" and "TWENTY-FIFTH".

AS AND FOR AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

THIRD: That plaintiff has litigated the same issues producted to this Court in the Courts of the State of New York, in which Courts plaintiff's action was dismissed, that said dismissal is res judicata as to the issues raised in this proceeding.

AS AND FOR A SHOOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

FOURTH: That plaintiff his litigated the same issues in the Courts of the State of New York and by said litigation in the Courts of the State of New York the plaintiff elected his remedy.

WHEREFORE, defendant demands judgment against the plaintiff dismissing plaintiff's complaint.

Yours, etc. STANLEY F. KOOPER Office and P.O. Address 16 Gourt Street Brooklyn, New York 11241 Attorney for Defendants NOTICE OF CROSS MOTION FOR DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT (Filed May 14, 1976)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

JOSEPH BOSSOM.

Judge Mark A. Constantino

Plaintiff.

Civ 75 C 1420

-against-

NAOMI BOSSOM and STANLEY E, KOOPER,

NOTICE OF CROSS MOTION

Defendant.

SIR:

please take Notice that upon the pleadings herein and upon plaintiff's motion by way of Notice of Motion for summary judgment in plaintiff's favor and against defendants, granting relief requested in plaintiff's complaint, and exhibits upon which said motion is made, a cross motion will be made by the defendants pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Practice, upon the argument of said motion for summary judgment, returnable at the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, before Honorable Mark A. Constantino, at 225 Cadman Plaza East, County of Kings City and State of New York, on the 14th day of May 1976 at 10:00 o'clock in the forenoon of that day or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard for an order dismissing plaintiff's complaint together with such other and further relief as to this Court as may seem just and proper in the premises.

Dated: Brooklyn, New York May 12, 1976

> Yours, etc. STANLEY E. KOOPER Attorney for Defendants 16 Court Street Brooklyn, New York 11241 855-2324

TO: GFLBWAKS & POLLACKS
Attorneys for Plaintiff
I. Miles Pollack, of Counsel
299 Broadway
New York, New York 10007

AFFIDAVIT OF STANLEY E. KOOPER IN SUPPORT OF CROSS MOTION TO DISMISS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

JOSEPH BOSSOM,

Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CROSS MOTION TO DISMISS

-against-

NAOMI BOSSOM and STANLEY E, KOOPER,

Defendants.

STATE OF NEW YORK)
COUNTY OF KINGS) s.s.:

STANLEY E. KOOPER, Esq., being duly sworn, deposes and says:

1. I am the attorney for NAOMI BOSSOM, and a named defendant in the proceedings and I make this affidavit in support of defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

BACKGROUND

2. The plaintiff, JOSEPH BOSSOM, and the defendant, NAOMI BOSSOM, were married September 19, 1954, in the City and State of New York. There are three children of the marriage; namely, JACK, born August 26, 1956; LUCY, born April 22, 1960; and CIARON, born December 22, 1965.

On July 1, 1974 the parties were divorced by a decree of divorce, granted by Honorable Justice Thomas R. Jones in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Kings.

By the terms of the divorce decree, the defendant herein. NACMI
BOSSOM, was awarded exclusive possession of the marital home until the youngest child reached the age of twenty-one years, at which time the house would be sold and the proceeds divided equally.

At the time the divorce action was pending JOSEPH BOSSOM had, for a substantial period of time, failed to contribute to the support of his wife and children. In settlement of NAOMI BOSSOM's claim for support and to insure continued support a stipulation of settlement was executed by the parties and incorporated in the final judgment of divorce.

At the time the stipulation was executed, a deed executed April 15, 1974 was transferred to the defendant, STANLEY E. KOOPER, Esq., to hold in escrow.

On May 22, 1975 plaintiff, JOSEPH BOSSOM, commenced a proceeding in the Supreme Court of Kings County to resettle the judgment of divorce and for a downward modification of the support provisions of the judgment of divorce. This motion is pending in Supreme Court, Kings County.

On August 28, 1975 plaintiff commenced this action to declare the stipulation between plaintiff, JOSEPH BOSSOM, and defendant, NAOMI BOSSOM, null and void.

GROUNDS FOR DISMISSAL

3. Plaintiff, JOSEPH BOSSOM, has clearly commenced this action in Federal Court in order to use the Federal Court system against the New York State Court system.

Plaintiff submitted to the jurisdiction of the New York Court and could assert this cause of action to declare the stipulation null and void in the very proceeding he commenced in Supreme Court, Kings County, which is still open and pending.

The conclusion is inescapable that the plaintiff is forum shopping.

It is respectfully submitted that this Court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction in this matter inasmuch as the plaintiff's forum shopping should not be approved.

As a second ground for dismissal it is pointed out to the Court that the stipulation in this matter has been incorporated and made part of a New York judgment of divorce. The Court should therefore further decline to exercise its jurisdiction herein inasmuch as to do so would involve the Court in a domestic relations dispute which does not come within the subject matter jurisdiction of this Court and which matters the Federal Courts have traditionally refrained from adjudicating.

Thirdly, the plaintiff's complaint alleges as the basis for his cause of action that the stipulation is contrary to the public policy of the State of New York. It is respectfully submitted that the issue of the public policy of the State of New York is a matter for determination by the Courts of New York and that inasmuch as plaintiff has commenced a proceeding in Supreme Court for modification of the judgment of divorce this matter of the stipulation and its validity should, likewise, be heard in the local forum,

Further, it is submitted that this Court as a matter of comity should abstain from exercising its jurisdiction inasmuch as to exercise its jurisdiction would involve this Court in the administration of the Domestic Relations Law of the State of New York and would also constitute a collateral attack on a pending State Court proceeding in which no claim of denial of Federal Constitutional rights is alleged.

WHEREFORE, deponent respectfully requests that this action be dismissed.

STANLEY E. KOOPER, ESQ.

Sworn to before me this /2 day of May 1976.

Commissioner of Deede
City of New York No. 2-2357
Certificate filed in idea, York Court
Commission Expires April 1, 1978

AFFIDAVIT OF BERNARD J. JAFFE IN OPPOSITION TO CROSS MOTION FOR DISMISSAL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK	
x	
JOSEPH BOSSOM,	
Plaintiff,	AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION TO CROSS-MOTION FOR DISMISSAL
-against-	
	Civil Action No.
NAOMI BOSSOM and STANLEY E. KOOPER,	75 C 1420
Defendants.	(M.A.C.)
x	
STATE OF NEW YORK)	
COUNTY OF NEW YORK) ss.:	

BERNARD J. JAFFE, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

- l. I am an attorney and counsellor-at-law admitted to practice in the courts of this state including this Court, and I am associated with the firm of GELBWAKS & POLLACK, the attorneys for the plaintiff in the above entitled action; and I am fully familiar with all of the facts and circumstances herein.
- 2. The plaintiff has made a motion for summary judgment. The defendants have made a cross-motion for an order dismissing the complaint.
- 3. The defendants allege that the relief requested in the complaint could have been asserted in the matrimonial proceeding in the Supreme Court of the State of New York.

- 4. The present action is not a matrimonial action.

 If the plaintiff had chosen to proceed in the state court, he would have had to have brought an independent action to set aside the separation agreement. He could not have proceeded by making a motion within the matrimonial action. The relief requested in the complaint, if granted, will have no effect what-soever upon the plaintiff's obligations to his children as set forth in the judgment of divorce. All that will happen is that a provision for an onerous and unconscionable penalty will be stricken.
- 5. With respect to the defendants' argument that there is now pending a state court action such orgument is specious for the reasons stated above and because any matrimonial action in New York remains open until all of the infant issue of the marriage have reached majority and until the ex-wife has remarried. A request for a modification of the judgment of divorce can be made by either party at any time.
- 6. The matrimonial court is powerless to eliminate the penalty contained in the stipulation, which was incorporated in the judgment of divorce. The defendants' assertion that there was consideration for the penalty is an anomaly in that no consideration can validate a penalty; however, a separate action was still required to eliminate this sword from over the plaintiff's head.

WHEREFORE, your deponent respectfully prays for an order granting the plaintiff's motion in all respects and denying the defendants' cross-motion.

BERNARO J. JAFFE

Sworn to before me this 18th day of May, 1976.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER BY CONSTANTINO, D.J. (Filed June 1, 1976)

75-C-1420

Plaintiff,

7.7

MEMORANDUM and ORDER

NAOMI BOSSOM and STANLEY E. KOOPER,

Defendants.

JUN 1 1976

COSTANTINO, D.J.

In a recent case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit emphasized that

[t]he policy of our court will remain, the case being otherwise

equal in equity, to keep our federal hands off actions which verge on the matrimonial or impinge upon the matrimonial jurisdiction of the state courts.

Kamhi v. Cohen, 512 F.2d 1051,
1056 (2d Cir. 1975)

Analysis of the facts leads this court to conclude that it should decline to assume jurisdiction in this case. Accordingly, the case is dismissed. The Clerk of the court is directed to enter judgment in accordance with this opinion.

So ordered.

LUTZ APPELLATE PRINTERS, INC.

UNITED	STATES	COURT	OF	APPEALS
SECOND	CIDCUIT	r		

Index No.

JOS EPH BOSSOM.

P lintiff-Appellant.

- against -

Affidavit of Service by Mail

NAOMI BOSSOM and STANLESS E. KOOPER.

Defendants-Appellees

STATE OF NEW YORK. COUNTY OF

SS.:

1. Velma N. Howe. being duly sworn, depose and say that deponent is not a party to the action, is over 18 years of age and resides at 298 Macon Street, Brooklyn, New York 11216 That on the day of

September

, deponent served the annexed

appendix

upon Stanley Kooper attorney(s) for

Defendants-Appellees

in this action, at 16 Court Street Brooklyn, N.Y.

the address designated by said attorney(s) for that purpose by depositing a true copy of same, enclosed in a postpaid properly addressed wrapper in a Post Office Official Depository under the exclusive care and custody of the United States Post Office Department, within the State of New York.

Sworn to before me, this 15th day of September

19 76.

Beth A. Ruch

BETH A. HIRSH NOTARY PUBLIC, State of New York No. 41-4623156

Qualified in Queens County Commission Expires March 30, 1978